When I was growing up, my parents hardly ever “told me” what to do or what not to do. So when my sixth grade teacher started hitting my palms during clean-up time (in most Korean schools, students clean the classrooms and hallways, not janitors) because he wanted to punish everyone in the class for talking and playing around instead of cleaning, it was not a surprise that I yelled, “I was quietly moping the floor!!!!” Everyone was surprised—it was against common law to express your innocence as a student to a teacher like that. Later on the teacher, known as “tiger” for his fearsome quality, called up my parents and told them their daughter was indeed a “Baek-ey-min-jok” (the white-clad folk, a prideful term for the Korean people) who will become an important person in the world.
After graduating from middle school I went on to high school and after the welcoming ceremony, where I didn’t feel welcomed at all (it was like I was in military school), I decided high school was the last place I wanted to be—oppressive, dull middle school all over again. When I asked my dad for permission to quit school, he asked if I could try it out for a semester. I did, but I spent most of the school days in the nurse’s office because (now that I think about it) I was severely depressed. My dad, who knew I would have to quit school sooner or later but needed to earn time to think ahead for my future, signed a paper at the end of the first semester permitting my release, and then I was free to go. I thought, in the beginning, it was my classmates’ mindless talk about T.V. drama and celebrities or uninteresting classes that made me want to escape the place. However, after leaving school and learning more about myself, I came to realize there was
something more to my desire to escape. Having read the four essays of authors, John Berger, Susan Bordo, Linda Nochlin, and Michael Foucault, I can now better articulate that
something more that is far more interesting than what any psychiatrist might say. I wasn’t just having an identity crisis—there was an internal war going on between creativity and discipline.
It was a relief to read Berger’s
Ways of seeing, Bordo’s
Beauty (Re)discovers the Male body, Nochlin’s
Bathing as Practice, Bathing as Representation, and Foucault’s
Panopticism—I felt for the first time, someone other than my parents understood me. However, when I first read Berger’s work to write an essay on the process of situating myself in history while looking at Salvador Dali’s
Persistence of Memory, I felt like my understanding of the subject was limiting. As I read Bordo’s work to write an essay on comparing and contrasting both Berger and Bordo’s ideas, the concepts of culture, identity, and agency became clearer—I expanded on the notion of culture and the commodity-self while adding on the concepts of freedom, individuality, and ideology. Reading Nochlin and Foucault’s works broadened my understanding of all four of the authors’ ideas, one author’s ideas facilitating the others—the relationship among power, knowledge, and discourse lead me to think of the relationship between discipline and creativity in our present culture.
According to Merriam-Webster dictionary online, identity is “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual,” also known as individuality (“identity”). However, as Alice, in
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, many of us have difficulty answering the caterpillars question, “Who are you?” Unlike RenĂ© Descartes who believed that each of us has an intrinsic “soul” that stays the same throughout our lives regardless of external influences, Michael Foucault believes that although we talk about a person’s character as if it were her inner essence—as a standard discourse—more accurately, her identity is communicated through her interaction with others, constantly in flux. For Foucault, external force—whether it is called history, culture, or ideology—forms our identities. In my essay,
Talk To Me, Rubbery Floppy Pocket Watches! I write, “Part of my identity is formed, shaped and created through the reading of this painting [
Persistence of Memory], through my recognition of our history and my own personal history” (Son 7). Here, I am talking about how, in the process of questioning the meaning of the painting, I create an interpretation of the painting, which is affected by what I know and what I believe as Berger asserts in his essay, while on the other hand my identity is also affected in the process of determining my interpretation. In short, my confrontation with the painting forms a dialectic relationship between the painting (the image) and me (the viewer), similar to that of culture and cultural products or cultural representations.
“Culture,” according to the editors of
Practices of Looking, is “the shared practices of a group, community, or society, through which meaning is made out of the visual, aural, and textual world of representations” (Sturken and Cartwright 3). As I write in
Cultural Representations in Classical Art and Contemporary Advertisement: Reproduction of Images, Ideologies, and Identities, “Culture” is a persistent force that more or less determines who we believe ourselves and others to be:
…even if you and I were to choose our own identities—which would imply that our identities consist of more than our intrinsic nature—we are constantly breathing in and out “Culture” as if it were air. Culture is what surrounds us; it is our visible and invisible environment. There is no escape. It still exists even when we are holding our breaths and closing our eyes. (Son 2)
In her essay, Susan Bordo shows us how consumer culture, commodity culture, representations of female and male body in advertisements can affect what we consider beautiful. She would say that my self-image of my body is influenced by the dominant representations of the female body in our culture: presently, I would say, slim, thin, and tall. My preference for a slim, not-too-muscular male body, she would say, is also influenced by mainstream representations. Furthermore, according to Bordo, my heightened interest in surface beauty—the looks of a sexy male model—and the nervousness that follows my act of gazing upon that model are also cultural constructs. When I was fifteen I wanted to be a model. I wanted to be thin as a chopstick (which was the most envied body type at the time in Korea), popular, and wealthy. I think the idea is absurd now that I’m enjoying reading, writing, and (for the most part) eating, and cannot imagine myself feeling satisfied working as a model, yet at the time, it was all I knew, all I saw, and all that my friends would talk about. I know I was and am and will continue to be influenced by culture, however unlike when I was fifteen, I try to be more aware of how I’m being influenced, which allows me to feel more comfortable in my own skin.
Although Berger himself cannot avoid being part of culture, he manages to create alternative discourse other than the standard discourse of the discipline of art history, as he situates himself in history in order to “see” the art of the past. For Berger, history is not “a chronological record of significant events” nor “an established record,” (“history”) it is the culture of the past, in which, in order to better understand the culture, we must actively interpret different cultural representations of the time in history. Berger thus says we must examine the values and ideologies of the past and the power relationship between different classes, race, and gender without a bias for the “privileged minority” (“Cultural Representations” Son 5). Similarly, Bordo insists we must “understand how we came about to this phenomenon of young, naked, sexually ambiguous male bodies being displayed in advertisements” (“Cultural Representations” Son 5). Likewise, Nochlin sees the “bather theme” as a “highly artificial and self-conscious construction…particular to a certain historical period,” and situates “the bather, and bathing, back into history of social institutions, practices, and representations” (Nochlin 455). Most importantly, she considers what has been ignored or unsaid about bathing as practice and as representation. She takes a look at the larger picture, the politics and policies of “putting the body in its place” as she calls it, and the discourses surrounding it. She connects the policy of the “Enlightenment ideals of control, hygiene, and civil order” with the discourse of “prostitution, sanitation, and wet-nursing, to which the discourse of swimming and bathing are related in that all are concerned with the body’s products, comportments, or employments” (462). Nochlin sees Renoir’s
Great Bathers as “a record of conflicting desires, intentions, and practices” constituting “a response to a multitude of pressures during the period preceding its creation” (466). So rather than seeing the
Great Bather as a masterpiece or a sorry failure, she suggests that the painting is “the result of certain kinds of practices, the product of a particular shifting structure of cultural institutions at a particular moment of history” (472). As I write about the relationship between history and identity in my previous essay, the power of history is not to be over looked:
We have always, throughout history, struggled to make sense of our experiences and our lives. When I try to “situate” myself in history, as Berger suggests us to do, I belong to the culture, and this gives a sense of where I am in relation to the larger historical context. Without this learning of our history and self-knowledge we can feel alienated, and uprooted like a tree floating around living above the ground. (“Talk To Me” Son 8)
For Foucault, history is a form of knowledge and simultaneously a form of power; it is a medium that controls and subdues the past through the production of discourse. Power, to Foucault, is not something we possess; it is what we exercise. Thus, power circulates and where there is power, there is also resistance. Power is not all negative as it also induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourses. Knowledge, as Foucault would say, is not disinterested to power and cannot exist separate from power as not only does knowledge assume the authority or “the truth” or “fact” is has the power to make itself true. However, knowledge is not “true” in the absolute sense of “truth”—it is a discursive formation that facilitates what is thought to be true in a moment of history or in culture, according to Foucault. He sees “discourse” as a system of representation; the rules and practices that produce meaningful statements and regulate discourse in different historical periods was thus, a matter of significance to Foucault. Discourse, he argues, constructs the topic, defines what constitutes as knowledge, and governs the way we make meaning of a topic; thus, nothing has any meaning outside of discourse. If culture is like air, discourse is what enables us to breath air, in and out; without it we would suffocate, stagnate, or cease to exist.
According to Foucault, “discipline” is a type of power, a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, a technology that produces discourse (Foucault 227). In philosopher J. Bentham’s image of the Panpticon, Foucault sees a “machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen” (216). He asserts that this “seeing” and “being seen,” the effect of gaze, or “surveillance” makes it possible for anyone, for whatever purpose, to exercise power. The Panopticon thus, becomes “a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (219). When “spread throughout the whole social body,” (223) the “mechanisms of observation” (219) forms what we call a “disciplinary society” (223). “Discipline,” according to Foucault, has multiple facets:
[Discipline] may be taken over either by “specialized” institutions, or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by preexisting authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power, or by apparatus that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning, or finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police). (227)
As Foucault asserts, “the disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical inventions that made it possible to increase the useful size of multiplicities by decreasing the inconveniences of the power which, in order to make them useful, must control them” (231). Thus, according to Foucault, disciplinary institutions, like the prison, and other mechanisms of discipline, exercise a power of normalization. He sees the image of the Panopticon or the prison, as an idea, a way of thinking about transgression and order, a way of thinking that is persistent and present, a body that pertains an important mechanism, which automatizes and disindividualizes power to produce the “normal” or “disciplined individual.”
However, even as a “disciplined individual,” there are ways to assert individuality and creativity. With effort, we can become aware that we are disciplined, that we are shaped by culture, history, and discourse. Once we are aware and once we know what we are being taught we can be self-critical about ourselves and what we learn in our area of discipline (writing, for example) and resist certain knowledge and discourse, thus breaking the rules (rules of grammar perhaps) and creating new discourse that we feel describes and represents more accurately our identities and the reality we wish to portray. As far as the discourses of images go, Berger would agree:
If the new language of images were used differently, it would, through its use, confer a new kind of power. Within it we could begin to define our experiences more precisely in areas where words are inadequate. Not only personal experience, but also the essential historical experience of our relation to the past: that is to say the experience of seeking to give meaning to our lives, of trying to understand the history of which we can become the active agents. (Berger 118)
Nochlin also asserts agency and generates alternative discourse against the standard discourse of art history. She makes it clear in her essay that “there is no single way of understanding
The Great Bathers, that its meanings are multiple, construed differently, often at cross-purposes by different viewers and interpreters” and that “It is only by allowing new interpretations that works of art—in our case, representations of bathers, but also bathtime itself as a cultural entity—can be more fully understood and remain a living, sometimes unruly entity rather than a respectable corps” (Nochlin 473).
As I write in my essay on
Persistence of Memory, “If we take away previous assumptions of art and strip it down to art as an image, we are left with something we must interpret and make meaning for ourselves,” if I strip my identities down to me as a human being with unlimited possibilities, I am left with having to create my own identity (“Talk To Me” Son 1). This does not mean that I can somehow exist separate from external influences. However, it is a thought experiment, where I can see what I am left with, see what I choose to believe in about myself, after disposing all labels I identify myself with. I did this experiment several times after leaving high school because all of a sudden I felt like I was nobody. I did not have an institution or occupation to identify with; I was like an actress on stage with no role to play. As Kurt Vonnegut reminds us in
Mother Night, “We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.” Through different experiments and experiences I realized that I became more vibrant and happy when I somehow helped others with the skills I’ve attained—and thus, learning and helping others became what I value the most. My previous experiences lead me to believe that my life purpose, for now at least, is to contribute in generating alternative ideas for our current education system. Berger, Bordo, Nochlin, and Foucault tells me that in order to be an individual, and be free, we must first see how culture, history, and discourse affect how we see the world and ourselves. Seeing that you and I have a choice and can decide what to value and what to believe in to what degree; seeing that by making choices we take on agency which helps us better understand ourselves and the world; believing that there is nothing more inspiring in life than putting effort into becoming a better person through the choices you make; all of this is what, I believe, distinguishes us humans from lab rats, and I believe it is the most effective way to pursue freedom and happiness—So, let’s question everything we see, not with fear, but with curiosity.
Works Cited
Berger, John. “Ways of Seeing.” Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers. Eds. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. 8th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008.
Bordo, Susan. “Beauty (Re)discovers the Male Body.” Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers. Eds. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. 8th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008.
Foucault, Michael. “Panopticism.” Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers. Eds. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. 8th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008.
"history." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2008. Merriam-Webster Online. 8 June. 2008
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"identity." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2008. Merriam-Webster Online. 8 June. 2008 .
Nochlin, Linda. “Renoir’s Great Bathers: Bathing as Practice, Bathing as Representation.” Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers. Eds. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. 8th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008.
Son, Vickie. “Cultural Representations in Classical Art and Contemporary Advertisement: Reproduction of Images, Ideologies, and Identities.” Diss. Southern Oregon U, 2008.
---. “Talk To Me, Rubbery Floppy Pocket Watches!” Diss. Southern Oregon U, 2008.
Sturken, Marita, and Lisa Cartwright. Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture. New York: Oxford UP, 2001.